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Introduction 
Why should liberals be democrats? One popular answer is predicated on the intrinsic value of 
democratic procedures. By empowering citizens to rule, democracy honors the ideal of autonomy 
that is itself the cornerstone of liberal political morality. But we need only look to cases of 
democracy gone awry – in which democratic procedures are marshaled toward the production of 
grossly illiberal outcomes – to wonder if honoring autonomy can really be the whole story for 
democracy’s justification. For the liberal case for democracy to be secure, it must also include 
some account of democracy’s epistemic value: its tendency to achieve outcomes that are 
acceptable by the standards of liberal justice. But on what basis could democracy be expected to 
do this? In his book Democratic Authority, David Estlund locates a candidate answer to this 
question within the literature on deliberative democracy, an answer grounded in what he calls the 
democracy/contractualism analogy: the idea that democracy can secure justice due to crucial 
similarities between good democratic politics and the idealised choice situations employed by 
contractualist liberals to explicate or construct correct principles of justice. On this analogy, the 
collective political decision-making definitive of democracy is best conceived as an attempt to 
realize the very process of intersubjective justification that (according to contractualist liberals) 
defines what is just; therefore, any tendency democracy might have to produce just outcomes 
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could conceivably be attributed to the success of such an attempt. Estlund considers and rejects 
this analogy. In so doing, he powerfully resists the prevailing inference from contractualist 
liberalism (the idea that correct principles of liberal justice can be construed as the conclusions 
to a hypothetical choice situation among reasonable citizens) to deliberative democracy (the idea 
that politics should ideally operate along the lines of such choice situation). Therefore, according 
to Estlund, while liberals should be democrats for many reasons, they should not be democrats 
on the basis of a democracy/contractualism analogy, and they should not be the kinds of 
deliberative democrats suggested by the analogy. 
 In this essay my aim is to undermine Estlund’s argument against the 
democracy/contractualism analogy, and to suggest in so doing that a particular version of the 
analogy is, in fact, a plausible explanation for why democracy is the ideal institutional 
arrangement for contractualist liberals. In Part I, I ask why contractualist liberals might contend 
that democracy possesses epistemic value, and I present the proposal that a 
democracy/contractualism analogy (DCA) could justify this contention. In Part II, I will argue 
that Estlund’s rejection of this proposal relies upon a flawed interpretation of the nature of the 
particular contractualist situation (T. M. Scanlon’s) in reference to which his argument is 
advanced. By defending an interpretation of Scanlon’s contractualist situation according to 
which it is best conceived as an account of how we ought to understand and engage in first-order 
moral deliberation, I show how it can ground a partial analogy between the kind of reasoning 
that transpires among participants in a contractualist situation and the kind of reasoning that 
citizens should ideally employ in their deliberations with one another as citizens of liberal 
democracies. In Part III, I will explain why the conception of participation at work in Scanlon’s 
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contractualist situation—in which parties seek to identify mutually justifiable principles, free 
from prior dogmatic commitments about what justice substantively requires—is precisely the 
participatory ideal that actual citizens should strive to realize. Finally, in Part IV, I will remark 
on how the democracy/contractualism analogy could successfully account for why democracy 
has epistemic value. I will suggest that when the practices of reflective citizenship of the kind 
specified by the analogy are entrenched, there may be a justifiable presumption that (a majority 
of) citizens will tend to affirm reasonable, as opposed to unreasonable, political proposals, and 
that this presumption plausibly grounds the argument for democratic voting as the best procedure 
for political decision-making in a liberal society.  
 
§1. Introducing the Democracy/Contractualism Analogy: What’s at Stake? 
David Estlund’s Democratic Authority is one of the most ambitious recent attempts to answer 
two questions that have dominated normative democratic theory since Rousseau: what is the 
justification for democracy, and why is it the kind of justification that citizens committed 
enduringly to one another’s moral status should accept? Estlund persuasively argues that voting 
cannot be justified on the mere basis of procedural fairness; if that all that mattered were 
procedural fairness, why not flip a coin to determine which policy to enact? Moreover, the 
intrinsic value of democratic procedures, flowing from their affirmation of citizens’ autonomy, is 
evidently insufficient to ground their justification entirely; were those procedures to result 
consistently in illiberal outcomes, our faith in their justifiability would be rightfully shaken. As 
Estlund compellingly argues, the justification of democracy most plausibly depends—at least 
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partially—on the idea that democracy has some epistemic value (2008). Part of what justifies 
democracy, in other words, is the moral quality of the decisions it tends to reach. 
 In the chapter of Estlund’s Democratic Authority that concerns me here, Estlund’s 
mission is to show why democracy’s modest epistemic value—its modest tendency to produce 
reasonable outcomes—is not to be explained by what he calls a democracy/contractualism 
analogy (DCA): the claim that democracy can “produce outcomes that are right by contractualist 
standards…by promoting the similarity (in certain respects) of actual procedures to the procedure 
in the hypothetical contractualist situation” (2008, p. 239). While Estlund fails to distinguish 
between the different versions of a DCA, there are several ways in which to understand what it 
might entail. The first part of Estlund’s discussion mostly addresses the idea of what we can call 
a structural analogy, according to which proper democracy secures justice because the structure 
of democratic decision-making mirrors the structure of some kind of idealised choice situation 
(such as Jürgen Habermas’s, in which participants have unlimited time to deliberate [1998 and 
2000], or Brian Barry’s Scanlon-inspired deliberation, in which every participant is equipped 
with veto power [1996]). This idea, Estlund properly detects, is a dead-end; it would be 
institutionally infeasible and normatively undesirable to give every actual, breathing citizen a 
veto over every policy. I will not dwell on this aspect of the discussion due to its evident 
fruitlessness, and instead move to a different kind of analogy that Estlund discusses, what I call a 
reasoning analogy. On this analogy, what is mirrored in actual politics is not the structure of an 
idealised situation, but rather the processes of reasoning in which parties to that situation engage. 
 Whom is Estlund talking about? In his original article on which the relevant chapter is 
based, he claims to be discussing “a central strand in theories of deliberative democracy,” though 
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this formulation is not present in the article’s current form (2003, p. 387). The roster he has in 
mind consists broadly of contractualists, including John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Brian Barry, 
Joshua Cohen, and William Nelson (1993; 1998 and 2000; 1996; 1989; 1980). All these thinkers 
rely upon some kind of idealised contractualist situation to explicate the content of justice—
whether it is the original position (Rawls), the ideal discourse situation (Habermas), the ideal 
deliberation (Cohen), what Barry calls a “Scanlonian original position” (drawing on Scanlon’s 
contractualist ethics), or what Nelson refers to as the democratic “tests” a principle must pass—
and, Estlund adds, believes that a deliberative democracy modeled in some way on that situation 
is the best way to achieve just outcomes. Because Estlund directs his discussion explicitly at 
Barry’s Scanlonian version of the democracy/contractualism reasoning analogy, I accordingly 
restrict my discussion to this particular version of the analogy. But if his rejection of this 
argument fails, as I believe it does, it does not follow that every possible version of the reasoning 
analogy is thereby vindicated. Such a sweeping argument would require careful analysis of each 
other thinker’s work, which I cannot undertake here. 
The simple insight underpinning the reasoning analogy I defend can be grasped by 
distinguishing two crucial questions. Firstly, how do we determine what laws are demanded by 
justice? Secondly, how should we determine what laws we are actually going to implement? The 
standard answer contractualist liberals offer to the first question is an account of a procedure of 
reasoning. The simple but arresting insight of the DCA is this: given that the morally proper end 
of legislation is indeed justice, the same procedure of reasoning by which we arrive at 
conclusions about what justice requires could be part of the way we determine what laws we are 
actually going to implement. In other words: if we all want the laws that are enacted to be just 
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laws, then let’s have the process of reasoning that enables us to identify what justice requires be 
the same process of reasoning that guides how we decide what to implement; if we do this, there 
is a hope that our conclusions will secure justice as opposed to injustice, for we will have 
engaged in the very process of reasoning that leads to the identification of ideally just principles 
and policies. That liberalism is itself predicated upon an affirmation of citizens’ moral powers 
transforms this hope into a justified presumption. 
This is the basic, rough shape of the best possible argument for a DCA along Scanlonian 
lines. Note a few points about the analogy. Firstly, it does not presume that democracy secures 
justice by “an invisible hand” (pace Estlund 2003, p. 387). Just as a contractualist situation can 
“go wrong” when philosophers make mistaken inferences, deductions, or judgements in the 
reasoning process, so too can democracy “go wrong” when citizens and lawmakers make 
mistaken inferences, deductions, or judgements in the reasoning process. My claim is a qualified 
and modest one: when the reasoning procedure specified by the analogy is democratically 
entrenched, this could ground democracy’s tendency to arrive at substantively reasonable 
outcomes—and thus secure democracy with the modest epistemic value that Estlund rightly 
thinks is essential to its justification (and do in a more plausible way than he does [2008, 
p.167]2). Secondly, the analogy does not presume that there is no reasonable disagreement about 
justice. On the contrary: what unites contractualist liberals is not their agreement on all 
substantive matters of policy (though no doubt there are certain demands of justice it would be 
                                                 
2 Estlund believes that democracy’s tendency to effectively avoid primary bads (war, famine, genocide, political 
collapse, etc.) is what confers democracy with modest epistemic value. But this empirical claim—which he 
explicitly chooses not to defend—is contestable; majoritarian votes have unjustifiably burdened the interests of 
minorities so frequently in democracy’s history that I cannot see how this could be the basis of democracy’s modest 
epistemic value. When democracies have successfully and enduringly secured justice, they have potentially done so 
precisely because their populations were concerned with justice’s achievement in precisely the manner that my 
version of the DCA enjoins. 
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unreasonable to deny); rather, it is their agreement of how to arrive at judgements about such 
matters. Moreover, the legitimacy of law plausibly does not depend on its achievement of 
perfectly just outcomes, since citizens are bound to reasonably disagree about what outcomes 
meet that exacting standard. What matters is that democracy has a tendency to reach outcomes 
within the set of reasonable candidates for the perfectly just outcomes (Rawls 2005, p. 450). 
That citizens will disagree is, of course, why a decision procedure—like democracy—is 
necessary. The DCA explains the conditions of democratic deliberation that ought always to 
preface this decision procedure if we are to have confidence that it will have a tendency to reach 
reasonable outcomes.  
  
§2. Defending the Democracy/Contractualism Analogy  
I will now examine Estlund’s argument against the version of the DCA I seek to defend, a 
Scanlon-inspired reasoning analogy. I believe that his argument against the reasoning analogy 
hinges upon an exegetically and philosophically suspect account of the role of the idealised 
choice situation in Scanlon’s contractualism, and that it fails for this reason. I will demonstrate 
its failure by denying one of Estlund’s central claims: that participants to a Scanlonian choice 
situation must not explicitly address “the primary question” of what justice requires.  
Scanlon’s contractualist principle stipulates that “an act is wrong3 if its performance 
under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation 
of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general 
agreement” (Scanlon 1998, p. 153). He contrasts his approach with that of Rawls, noting that 
                                                 
3 Scanlon aspires to explain a broader terrain of morality than justice—hence “wrong” instead of “unjust”—but the 
terrain he explains indeed includes justice. 
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“the fates of others” become relevant to parties in the original position since the oppressed and 
marginalized in society may include those for whom the deliberating parties are trustees. But 
Scanlon emphasizes that on his view, the involvement of others in the decision-making is 
reflected in “a different kind of motivation, namely the aim of finding principles that others, 
insofar as they too have this aim, could not reasonably reject” (Scanlon 1998, p. 191). Their aim 
is to determine what correct moral principles require through attempting collectively to identify 
principles acceptable to all, given their common motivation to live “in unity with our fellow 
creatures,” as J.S. Mill said, a characterization of moral life that Scanlon explicitly endorses 
(Mill 1987, p. 303).  
Note that the idea of an idealised contractualist situation appears only in the earliest 
announcement of Scanlon’s theory, where he refers to the idea of a “choice situation” in which 
individuals possess “full knowledge of their situations” and “a desire on each of their parts to 
find principles which none could reasonably reject insofar as they too have this desire” (Scanlon 
1982, p. 127). Brian Barry develops the idea of such a choice situation into the notion of a 
“Scanlonian original position,” in which the idea that each participant can reject unreasonably 
burdensome proposals is conceived as a veto power possessed by each (Barry 1996, pp. 67-72).  
Estlund identifies an interpretive problem in explaining how the process of principle-
selection in Scanlon’s choice situation is to work. What exactly do the parties to Scanlon’s 
situation ask themselves? The trick, Estlund contends, is that they cannot be construed as asking 
themselves “the primary question”: the question of “what we owe each other” or, equivalently in 
Scanlon’s view, the question of what “can be justified to others” (Scanlon 1998, p. 7). (For the 
purposes of this discussion, we can equate this with the question of “what justice requires” and 
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with the question of what principles are “mutually justifiable.”) That is because—Estlund 
believes—Scanlon’s contractualist situation is intended to play a distinctive role as a device that 
helps us as philosophers answer the primary question. But if parties to the situation are simply 
asking that very question themselves, why do we need them?4 To assign parties the primary 
question would imperil “contractualism’s distinctiveness” (Estlund 2008, p. 251). This pushes 
Estlund to wonder whether parties are simply pursuing their own self-interest, rejecting 
proposals every time one frustrates a personal aspiration. But that cannot be quite right either, for 
Scanlon explicitly says that the parties “are assumed not merely to be seeking some kind of 
advantage but also to be moved by the aim of finding principles that others, similarly motivated, 
could not reject” (1998, p. 5). Estlund thus sets himself the challenge of conceiving how parties 
could be “moved” in this way while nevertheless not asking themselves the primary question—a 
challenge that must be accomplished, he thinks, if Scanlon’s contractualist device is to play any 
distinctive function from our own first-order moral reasoning.  
Estlund outlines a solution with two elements. Firstly—what he calls “reasonable self-
service”—we should conceive of parties as motivated to reject proposals “only if they 
themselves have personal reasons against them” (Estlund 2008, p. 248). In other words, “the 
contractual participants do not reject proposals on the grounds that they are reasonably rejectable 
by someone or other”—this would be the primary question—“but only for their own personal 
reasons” (p. 248). Secondly, we should conceive of each party as “prepared not to press a 
personal reason he has against a proposal if this would leave only alternatives to which others 
                                                 
4 Note that this is a different concern from the idea that Scanlon’s situation is circular. While Estlund conflates these 
two objections, the latter concerns the substantive role of judgement in Scanlon’s theory with respect to how reasons 
are to be weighed against each other. Even if Estlund’s characterization of Scanlon’s contractualist situation were 
correct—even if we could adequately conceive of parties as asking themselves something different from the primary 
question—the distinct worry of circularity would remain. I shall address this issue later on. 
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had objections at least as weighty” (p. 251). By combining these two elements, Estlund believes 
that “the idea of reasonable accommodation among the contractors could be brought in without 
giving them the primary question” (p. 252). 
 Estlund’s strategy is promising, and it could work—if only it weren’t for the following 
question: where do the alternatives that the parties consider come from? This unmentioned 
question haunts Estlund’s entire discussion. Unless there is some designer dropping proposals 
into the initial situation, like newly-cracked fortune cookies for parties to ponder, then proposals 
must come from participants. How could this be? Estlund does not say. Perhaps, as suggested by 
Estlund’s conception of “reasonable self-service,” parties press their own interests within 
reasonable limits. What does this mean? Estlund’s discussion gives us little guidance; all he says 
is that contractors accommodate one another purely by deciding not to veto a self-burdening 
proposal when alternative proposals are even more burdensome to others. We do not know 
whether he thinks any accommodation would transpire in the phase of proposing principles.   
 When we shift from the matter of rejecting proposals to the matter of advancing 
proposals, Estlund’s distinction between reasonable self-service, on the one hand, and addressing 
the primary question, on the other hand, collapses. We have no reason to think that Scanlon’s 
stipulation of parties as “moved by the aim of finding principles that others, similarly motivated, 
could not reject” applies only to their role in rejecting principles; such a presumption would be 
decidedly ad hoc (1998, p. 5). Now, when it comes to conceptualizing the process of rejection in 
the contractualist situation, it is perfectly coherent to stipulate that when a participant rejects a 
proposal, she will only reject it on the basis of personal reasons: if a proposed principle deeply 
frustrates someone’s commitments or interests, only that contractor will be the one who rejects it. 
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Likewise, it is perfectly coherent to say that a participant will take others’ interests into account 
by refraining from vetoing self-burdening proposals that burden others even more. But when we 
turn to the matter of a participant who proposes a principle that advances her interests, we must 
include the proviso within reasonable limits in order for that participant to still be the kind of 
agent who possesses the aim of finding mutually justifiable principles. And this modifying clause 
can mean only one thing: that she is advancing her interests by proposing principles that do not 
unreasonably burden the interests of others. But to propose principles that advance one’s 
interests within reasonable limits, and to propose principles that no one could reasonably reject, 
are one and the same. 
 Estlund writes:  
[T]ruly analogous participants will not address the question of justice itself, but only their own 
interests so far as they can be reasonably pressed. This is not egoism, but nor is it a sufficient 
orientation to the common good to support the tracking claim under circumstances of real and 
proper democratic choice…[J]ustice would not be directly addressed by participants who were 
analogous to the hypothetical contractors (Estlund 2008, p. 241). 
 
But this can’t be right. Pressing one’s interests only so far as reasonable means proposing 
principles that advance one’s interests but in a manner that does not unreasonably burden the 
interests of others. It is not enough to advocate a principle of distributive justice with the aim of 
advancing one’s own economic interests without demonstrating why it could not be reasonably 
rejected.  
 With this in mind, the distinction between advancing one’s own interests within 
reasonable bounds and searching for mutually justifiable principles disappears. There is no 
middle ground between pursuing one’s self-interest and pursuing mutually justifiable principles 
when it comes to the formulation of proposals. Moreover, Estlund’s analysis is misleading 
insofar as it suggests that a participant is not advancing one’s interests when she proposes 
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mutually justifiable principles. After all, to search for mutually justifiable principles—principles 
that no one could reasonably reject—is to search for principles that are justifiable to oneself, as 
well as to others. Part of explaining that a principle is mutually justifiable means showing why it 
permits us “to govern ourselves in a way that others could not reasonably refuse to license” 
(Scanlon 1998, p. 157). Principles that would considerably and unnecessarily burden one’s own 
(reasonable) aims are not mutually justifiable. Therefore, to identify mutually justifiable 
principles just is to identify principles that advance one’s own interests within reasonable 
bounds. I cannot think of a principle for the general regulation of behavior, or the distribution of 
benefits and burdens in society, that advances one’s interests in reasonable bounds but would not 
be described as mutually justifiable. In this way, Estlund’s distinction between “reasonable but 
self-serving motives” (Estlund 2008, p. 244) and the motives to find principles that no one, 
similarly motivated, could reasonably reject, is illusory when it comes to the matter of proposing 
principles. 
 Before proceeding to sketch an interpretation of Scanlon according to which we should 
see parties as asking themselves the primary question—and explaining why we should not regard 
this as unfortunate for the theory—I want to address one way in which Estlund could respond to 
my criticisms and defend the thesis that parties do not ask themselves the primary question. This 
would be to suggest that, while parties are accommodative at the rejection stage, we should 
conceive of parties as advancing principles as strictly self-interested when it comes to the stage 
of proposing principles. This, at first, seems to fit with the rest of Estlund’s account: party A 
proposes a monstrously self-serving principle that would require the subordination of the rest of 
humanity to A’s aims; B, burdened by A’s proposal, vetoes it; A politely declines to object in 
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response, recognizing the reasonableness of B’s rejection; and the self-serving principle thereby 
slides into the rejection pile.  
One crucial problem with this approach is that it is not clear how we end up determining 
the set of principles that lie beyond reasonable rejection if all that is happening is that parties 
propose self-serving accounts with no attention (at the stage of proposals) to reasonableness. The 
situation would consist in the multiply repeating proposal and rejection of the same candidate 
principles. So we would need an account of how each party proceeds once her prudentially 
optimal principles are rejected. What criteria would A use when making his next gambit? Do 
parties concede territory, as it were, each iteration of proposals—using information from the 
previous round of rejections to dilute the self-serving character of each fresh proposal as they 
bargain their way to justice? If so, how far do they dilute them, and in accordance with what 
criteria? If the criteria are moral, then there is pressure to think that the parties could just cut to 
the chase and propose mutually acceptable principles—which would undermine Estlund’s thesis 
that they are not asking themselves the primary question. I believe that these questions render 
this proposed interpretation unworkable. But even if they could be answered adequately, this 
would nevertheless be an extremely exegetically unattractive interpretation of Scanlon’s 
contractualist situation. Scanlon insists that we should regard parties as “moved by the aim of 
finding principles that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject” (1998, p. 5). It is 
highly implausible to think that this is somehow an error; Scanlon makes the comment precisely 
when he is contrasting his initial situation with others in the literature: “What distinguishes my 
view from other accounts involving ideas of agreement is its conception of the motivational basis 
of this agreement” (p. 5). Yet the idea that such parties are characterized as only prudentially 
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rational by (my extended version of) Estlund’s interpretation of the proposal phase clearly sits in 
serious tension with this characterization. It is worth searching for a rival interpretation of 
Scanlon’s contractualist situation that avoids this tension, and indeed that avoids the serious 
problems that I have shown to afflict Estlund’s reading.  
 
§3. Reconceiving Contractualism 
3.1. Reinterpreting Scanlon 
If my criticism of Estlund is sound, then we should regard Scanlon’s contractors as asking the 
primary question. This is the only way, I have argued, to make sense of Scanlon’s contention that 
they are “moved by the aim of finding principles that others, similarly motivated, could not 
reasonably reject” (1998, p. 5). Intriguingly, Estlund himself admits that this quotation “seems to 
give them the primary question”—though he only admits this in a footnote in his 2003 article; it 
does not appear in Democratic Authority. “The exegetical problem raised by these quotes in 
Scanlon cannot be pursued here,” Estlund continues in that footnote—a puzzling statement, 
given that the right way to understand Scanlon’s account is precisely the focus of his discussion 
(2003, p. 401n).   
Recall that what motivates Estlund is a worry that assigning the primary question to 
contracting parties will end up imperiling “contractualism’s distinctiveness” (2008, p. 251). If 
parties are simple asking the primary question, why do we need to think about them? We can just 
ask ourselves. The choice framework’s role as a device through which conclusions about right 
and wrong are constructed or determined depends, he thinks, on this not being the case. As a 
result, Estlund goes to great lengths to interpret Scanlon in a way that retains the distinct 
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character of the reasoning within his contractualist situation. But his efforts, as I have shown, are 
strained. Moreover, they are unnecessary. For, there is nothing incompatible between the claims 
(a) that parties to Scanlon’s contractualist situation ask themselves the primary question and (b) 
that Scanlon’s contractualist situation represents an account of how correct moral principles are 
best identified. That is because Scanlon’s contractualist situation just is a framework for 
understanding how moral reasoning—the process of arriving at determinate conclusions about 
right and wrong—properly proceeds. It is an account of first-order moral reasoning, through 
which determinate moral principles are identified or, if you prefer, constructed. 
 To understand this way of interpreting Scanlon, consider some structural similarities 
between his view and the view of moral justification offered by John Rawls. Glossing over 
details for the sake of simplicity,5 I think we can regard Rawls’s project as beginning by 
identifying (a) an account of citizens’ moral status as free and equal and (b) a companion account 
of their interests as free and equal (such as their interests in developing and exercising their 
moral powers, and in primary goods). He then seeks to determine (c) the principles by which 
social institutions should be arranged if they are to respect this understanding of persons as free 
and equal. The original position is a process of reasoning that takes us from where we start—
with (a) and (b)—over to (c). “The leading idea,” Rawls writes in 1980, “is to establish a suitable 
connection between a particular conception of the person and first principles of justice, by means 
of a procedure of construction” (1980, p. 516) And while the later Rawls hedges on his 
metaethical conviction that principles are constructed by this process (as opposed to discovered 
by it or, as the later Rawls comes to say, “represented as the outcome” of it), the structure is 
                                                 
5 For example, I am deliberately ignoring how the idea of society as a fair scheme of cooperation figures into the 
Rawlsian reasoning process. 
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clear: we begin with some account of normative “raw materials,” including an idea of the basic 
moral status of persons, and we reason our way from that account to specific principles (1993, p. 
93).  
 Scanlon’s account can be understood similarly. As Scanlon himself says,  
The very structure of the [contractualist] test is already a moral principle that constrains the kind of norms 
that can pass it. It is already a moral principle that everybody counts—that we should be able to justify our 
norms to everyone (qtd. in Voorhoeve 2009, p. 182). 
 
Scanlon thus begins with an account of the moral status of persons according to which they are 
equally entitled to justification. In virtue of this moral status, Scanlon believes—and here I am 
quoting Michael Ridge—that “everyone has reason to make room for the…agent-relative 
concerns of others” (Ridge 2001, p. 481). Scanlon thus proceeds to offer us an account of 
objective but nevertheless agent-relative reasons that each person has—reasons to seek food and 
shelter, pursue certain projects, devote time to one’s family, develop relationships, etc. (1998, p. 
204). What Scanlon’s contractualist deliberation does is serve as the framework of reasoning 
between these normative raw materials from which we begin—an account of the moral status of 
others and a companion account of persons’ agent-relative reasons—to reach specific 
conclusions about right and wrong. It describes how we should reason our way from these raw 
materials to arrive at conclusions about what we owe to each other.  And we do this by aiming to 
devise a set of principles that, given the objective agent-relative reasons for action people have, 
does not burden anyone in a way that could be avoided by a rival set of principles. We do this, in 
other words, by asking the primary question. Just as Rawls’s original position takes us from 
abstract normative raw materials to determinate conclusions, so too does Scanlon’s contractualist 
situation. Each is an account of how someone who endorses the fundamental ideas of the 
theory—who is morally committed, in Scanlon’s case, to the equal claim of all to justification—
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should reason her way to conclusions about what she ought to do. Indeed, DCA-pioneer Brian 
Barry’s influential proposal that we import Scanlon’s contractualist account into Rawls’s theory 
would only make sense if their accounts of contractualist reasoning played similar roles [Barry 
1996, pp. 67-72].)6 
 There are many virtues of interpreting Scanlon in this way. Firstly, it is in many respects 
a more natural reading. We need not strain to find a description of what goes on “inside” the 
contractualist situation that marks it out as distinct from what goes on “outside” in the first-order 
activities of moral deliberation; instead, we can embrace the idea that Scanlon’s descriptions of 
the ideal agents in each are identical. Just a page before Scanlon describes the parties as “moved 
by the aim of finding principles that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject” 
(1998, p. 5), he says, remarking on the phenomenology of moral experience: 
When I ask myself what reason the fact that an action is wrong gives me not to do, my answer is 
that such an action would be one that I could not justify to others on grounds I could expect them 
to accept (p. 4). 
 
My reading does not force us to invent some way in which these two descriptions differ. The 
idealised processes of reasoning that carry on inside the contractualist deliberation are the same 
processes of reasoning that we ourselves undertake when we do moral deliberation properly.  
Secondly, my interpretation helps to make sense of Scanlon’s mysterious contention that 
reasons of “fairness” can be invoked against principles in the contractualist situation. This is 
                                                 
6 It may appear that Rawls and Scanlon are crucially disanalogous in that Rawls’s parties cannot be conceived as 
asking themselves the primary question. But we can redescribe what goes on inside the original position in a way 
that eliminates this disanalogy. The original position is a matter of thinking about ourselves as free and rational 
agents, and then asking what principles secure our fundamental interests as free and rational agents, free from the 
morally arbitrary contingencies that render our choices heteronomous. These principles are the principles of justice. 
Recall that in the stirring final passage of A Theory of Justice, “to see clearly and to act with grace and self-
command” from the perspective of the original position (and thereby aspire to “purity of heart”) is precisely what 
Rawls enjoins us to do (1999, p. 514). Thus when appropriately described, even Rawls’s own procedure of 
construction can be viewed as one of asking the primary question—and undertaking the reasoning that leads one to 
settle on answers to that question. 
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because principles that “arbitrarily favor one person over others” offend against the root idea of 
the equal stranding of all persons that serves as the foundation of Scanlon’s contractualism 
(Scanlon 1998, p. 212).7 
Thirdly, this interpretation helps immunize Scanlon from the common objection that his 
theory is objectionably circular because it relies on substantive judgements. This common 
objection begins by recognizing that the reasonableness of any given rejection in Scanlon’s 
deliberation needs to be assessed somehow—namely, by assigning weights to agent-relative 
reasons people have for and against a proposed principle, and seeing which person’s reasons are 
strong enough to win out. But if this is true—and it is—a considerable amount of important work 
thereby transpires at the level of assigning moral weights to the different reasons, assignments 
which cannot be explained by the final principles of morality that are settled upon since they are 
necessary in reaching those final principles. What this objection concludes is that this makes the 
idea of a contractualist situation entirely dispensable: all we need to do is look at the realm of 
reasons for action, judge the relative strengths, and then see what principles are demanded or 
disallowed by the strongest reasons (Nicholas Southwood 2010, pp. 61-69).  
However, once we see that Scanlon’s account does not cast the contractualist situation as 
a specialized device, but rather a framework for understanding moral deliberation at its best—a 
framework that directs and orients these judgements in reasoning—this objection misses the 
mark. Scanlon is explicit about the role of judgement in his theory: 
According to my version of contractualism, deciding whether an action is right or wrong requires a 
substantive judgment on our part about whether certain objections to possible moral principles would be 
reasonable (1998, p. 194).  
 
                                                 
7 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point. 
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But this is not circular; it simply comes with the territory of all accounts of first-order moral 
reasoning (utilitarian, virtue-ethical, and Kantian alike). Rawls’s account, too, depends on 
judgement in determining how to lexically rank different principles. That there are such burdens 
of judgement in any theory is precisely why there is reasonable disagreement about what 
conclusions are properly reached—but this is an issue for any view (Rawls 2005, pp. 56-57). 
Once Scanlon’s account is understood as a description of idealised moral reasoning, the 
objection that such reasoning depends on substantive judgements becomes utterly unsurprising, 
and thus loses its force.8 Moreover, Scanlon himself says that while “the possibility of tightening 
contractualism” as a general moral theory to reduce the role of judgement is implausible at such 
a high level of abstraction as assessing “what we owe to each other,” he says that such tightening 
is “a feasible aim with respect to some specific areas of morality” (Scanlon 1998, p. 218). It is 
possible that the justice of social institutions is one of these areas.  
Fourthly, the most important reason to think that Scanlon would endorse this 
interpretation is that he does endorse it. Consider a restated form of the aforementioned 
circularity objection posed by Alex Voorhoeve:  
It seems that to get some determinate answers to questions of right and wrong, we must first decide which 
things count as valid ground for rejecting a principle. But this would appear to leave the procedure devoid 
of any content: any moral principle you pull out of the contractualist hat is put there at the outset when you 
decide which things count as grounds for rejecting a principle (2009, p. 182). 
 
 In response to this, Scanlon replies—and this is the kicker: 
                                                 
8 It is true that Scanlon is concerned to be sure that his framework is not “unnecessary” (1998, p. 213). But here he is 
concerned not with the role of judgement, but with the description of moral motivation: we must not describe 
idealised reasoners in such a way that they reason with substantively developed views of justice already on hand. 
That would make the framework unnecessary. But this proves my point: for moral deliberation would also be 
“unnecessary” is we had already decided and had made up our minds unreflectively about what we owe to each 
other. Scanlon’s parties, like us, should be armed with two things only: a capacity to make substantive judgements 
about reasons, and the willingness to search for mutually acceptable principles. These are a far cry from having a 
determinate account of justice already on hand. We still need a reasoning framework to get us there.  
 
20 
[W]e can’t avoid questions of judgement, and this could lead to the charge that the contractualist reaches 
conclusions only because he has helped himself to lots of substantive ideas along the way, and that the 
theory itself therefore doesn’t really yield new answer. It may be that this criticism is justified. There are 
different desiderata of a moral theory. I am inclined to think that providing a way of cranking out novel 
principles is overrated…What I mean to do is offer a way of understanding what moral thinking is (2009, p. 
183, emphasis added).  
 
Scanlon goes even further, disputing the idea that parties to his contractualist situation are best 
conceived (as Estlund recurrently does) as a “hypothetical agreement” that therefore must be 
modeled in some special way distinctly from our normal moral deliberation. Instead, Scanlon 
argues: 
To describe [my theory] as a ‘hypothetical agreement’ is already mistaken. It isn’t about what people would 
agree to under certain conditions. Rather, what matters is what it would be reasonable for them to reject 
under certain conditions, that is, if they, too, were trying to find principles that others could not reasonably 
reject (qtd in. Voorhoeve 2009, p. 184). 
 
That such conditions are hypothetical therefore only serves to indicate that they are idealised—
they characterize the conditions of faultless reasoning—not that they refer to the operations of 
mysterious, idiosyncratically motivated agents who undertake some special contract with one 
another. Rather, they refer to our moral reasoning about what we owe to each other, at its best.9 
Pessimistically, Michael Otsuka writes that Scanlon’s contractualist situation “is bought 
at the price of a reduction in the usefulness of the contractualist device as a means (distinct from 
ordinary forms of moral reasoning) of arriving at the right principles of justice” (2003, pp. 5-6). 
But Otsuka here makes the same mistake as Estlund: assuming that Scanlon’s contractualist 
situation was a specialized device to serve as a “means” to philosophers external to our first-
order moral reasoning. On the contrary: it is an account of how we ought to undertake first-moral 
order moral reasoning, one rooted in Scanlon’s thesis that “the idea of justifiability to others is 
                                                 
9 Aaron James, who casts Scanlon as a constructivist alongside Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and Onora O’Neill, 
writes that Scanlon’s contractualism is “concerned to characterize central features of moral reasoning […] which 
appear across a wide variety of cases, in a way which nevertheless might guide judgement about principles in 
specific contexts” (James 2012, p. 6, emphasis added). This supports my conclusion. 
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taken to be basic” to what morality is, and thus how we should undertake the search to identify 
its demands (1998, p. 5). 
 
3.2. From the idea to the practice of reasonable rejection 
Having presented an interpretation of Scanlon’s contractualism that regards it as a description of 
how we ought to understand and engage in first-order moral deliberation, I want to note some 
implications of this interpretation that are relevant for the defence of a Scanlon-inspired DCA. 
Scanlon’s discussion of deliberation is clearly focused on the idea of deliberation within a single 
person’s mind: each asks herself whether it could be reasonable for someone to reject the 
principle upon which she is about to act, and draws a personal judgement about its justifiability. 
But while Scanlon is right that such judgements are ones that “each of us must make for him- or 
herself,” he also emphasizes that “interaction with others plays a crucial role in arriving at well-
founded moral opinions” (1998, pp. 393-394). What I want to do here is show how Scanlon’s 
account of moral deliberation presents a useful organizing framework for those interactions in 
actual political life. 
Scanlon enjoins us to search for principles that no one could reasonably reject. But the 
could is crucial. After all, if participants to the moral deliberation really are the kinds of 
participants who seek mutually acceptable principles, why would there need to be any reasonable 
rejections that transpire at all? Who in the deliberation would have proposed a principle that was 
reasonably rejectable, and why would she have proposed it if she had the aim of finding mutually 
justifiable principles? If everyone reasons faultlessly in moral deliberation, and if we assume that 
all the addressed questions have determinate answers, then this will not happen. But, of course, 
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real deliberations will include moral mistakes. And when such mistakes are made, the right 
response in deliberation is to condemn them on the basis of reasons—to “reasonably reject” 
them. The powerful image of people who stand and actively reject proposals on the basis of their 
unreasonableness is indispensable to the democratic recreation of Scanlon’s process of 
reasoning. Such active rejections serve two vital roles in deliberation. The first is to expose 
malevolence: that people are wilfully acting by norms they cannot justify to others. But the 
second—what I want to pursue here—is epistemic. When we ask ourselves why someone in a 
real-life deliberation who is morally motivated might have proposed a principle that was 
reasonably rejectable, the answer is clear: because she did not know it was unreasonable. 
  I want to develop the proposal that Scanlon’s contractualism provides not just a 
framework for individual moral deliberation, but constitutes a powerful proposal for collective 
moral deliberation. Recall how this framework operates. When a proposal is advanced, he 
claims, the first task is to identify whether any participant has a justifiable objection to the 
proposed principle. If a participant does—if the proposal burdens her in a way that alternative 
arrangements could avoid without burdening another participant more—the proposal must be 
rejected. In making such a determination, it must also be considered whether the failure to permit 
this principle would have far worse effects on others; in such a case, those others might respond 
with objections to the proposed prohibition of the proposed principle (Scanlon 1998, pp. 202-
203). 
 This idea of a dialectical exchange of considerations that results in a judgement about 
whether a proposed rejection of a proposed principle is reasonable is also reflected in Scanlon’s 
discussion of generic reasons, or reasons that are grounded in “commonly available information 
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about what people have reason to want…in virtue of their situation, characterized in general 
terms” (Scanlon 1998, p. 171).10 It is on the basis of these generic reasons that the proposed 
rejections of principles are justified—are deemed reasonable rejections. Consider how the 
process of generalization transpires. Participant A advances a proposal whose adoption would 
advance her interest, but believing that it does not unreasonably burden others. Participant B then 
contends that A’s proposal does, in fact, burden B’s interests in a manner that an alternative 
arrangement would not; B then proposes this alternative arrangement. Participant C then objects 
that the new arrangement is overly burdensome to her, and that a further alternative is available.  
 Now fill in the example with a very easy and pretty implausible (but conveniently clear) 
case. Perhaps A proposed that her Catholicism be the religion of the state, thinking that it would 
allow to practice her Catholic beliefs easily, and being unaware that there are others who would 
object strongly; B, a Protestant, responds by suggesting that they generalize the proposal to make 
Christianity the official religion of the state, so as not to burden B’s interests in practicing her 
own sect’s faith; and then suppose C, a Buddhist, suggests they generalize the principle further to 
be a principle of religious freedom, whereby all can exercise their religion of choice. They have 
now arrived at a principle that no one could reasonably reject, and specifically through the 
identification of the generic reasons. 
 The upshot of the idea of generic reasons is that an agent who rejects a proposed principle 
must explain the burden that the acceptance of such a principle would inflict upon her in terms 
all could coherently relate to. For example, if a person felt compelled to consume a particular 
kind of food in accordance with her religious beliefs, and a principle was proposed that would 
                                                 
10 Among such generic reasons, Scanlon argues, are “reasons to want to avoid bodily injury,” “to be able to rely on 
assurances they are given,” “to have control over what happens to their own bodies,” and so on, including being able 
to “give special attention to our own projects, friends, and family” (1998, p. 204).  
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have the consequence of banning the consumption of that food, she would have to explain her 
plight in mutually comprehensible terms by claiming that a principle forcing someone to 
sacrifice a core practice endorsed by that person’s conscience, in the absence of further evidence 
that the practice’s exercise burdens others in any comparable way, is a reasonably rejectable 
principle. But in order to endorse her situation as such, I maintain, one would have to 
comprehend the basic role of the particular food in her religion, and the fact that she actually 
endorsed it as central to her core beliefs, in order to understand her argument, or to confirm that 
her particular situation would indeed be protected by the generic value to which she is appealing. 
Cases of this kind abound from political experience; the justifiability of serving pork in state 
school cafeterias would never have been considered an issue of justice before some began to 
question it. In such cases, each side must perform important mental work: the objector must do 
the work of redescribing her situation under a generic reason, like dietary autonomy or liberty of 
conscience; and everyone else must realize that the practice in question is correctly protected by 
the generic reason—even if the practice is one predicated on specific values they do not share, or 
even that they potentially repudiate in their own lives.  
 Indeed, it is precisely because the particular claims subsumed under generic reasons are 
often subject to intense epistemically reasonable disagreement, that the process of working out 
what kinds of claims are or are not covered by generic reasons is particularly onerous. Consider 
Scanlon’s example of a generic reason: privacy. People have many different reasons for favoring 
privacy, but their underlying normative accounts of its importance vary considerably. Therefore, 
someone who objects to a situation because it would subject her to shame and humiliation—a 
conservative Muslim woman in a Western airport forced to undergo a strip-search and thereby 
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expose bare skin to passing men, for example—needs to redescribe her needs in mutually 
comprehensible terms, in generic values. This redescription will be especially important since 
many Westerners do not object to such strip-searches on privacy grounds. They are thus are less 
inclined to see the objection as covered by the generic reason of privacy, and precisely since so 
many of them disagree reasonably (in the epistemic sense) with the underlying principle that 
women ought not expose bare skin to passing men. But the redescription is motivated by her aim 
to find mutually justifiable principles: to find principles that protect her interests within 
reasonable bounds and are defended in a way that demonstrates their reasonableness by being 
cast in a general language that all in the moral community can share. 
 The notion of a generic reason is intuitive to members of liberal cultures, accustomed as 
we are to conceptual taxonomy—subsuming particular complaints, grievances, and claims under 
general pre-established classificatory categories. But the word “pre-established” does a lot of 
work here, and it is not obvious in advance of political experience what these pre-established 
categories are. They need to be worked out through social and political practice. As Nancy 
Fraser notes, “Until quite recently, feminists were in the minority in thinking that domestic 
violence against women was a matter of common concern and thus a legitimate topic of public 
discussion” (Fraser 1992, p. 129). Examples like these make it difficult to suggest that the 
identification of generic reasons is a single task to be accomplished once and for all in a single 
moment of theoretical reflection; after all, when so many philosophers of the past were mistaken 
in their views on women and race, who is to say what we today are mistaken about? It is more 
plausible, then, to describe the identification of generic reasons as a process whose conclusions 
must continually be regarded provisionally (Cf. Habermas 1990, pp. 43-115; 1998b, pp. 49-101). 
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Fittingly, Scanlon explicitly endorses the thesis that the identification of generic reasons is an 
ongoing process through which moral agents constantly reflects on the particular things that 
particular people have reason care about, and the generalized patterns that emerge from 
reflecting on these things as we consider what limits the contractualist ideal of mutual 
justifiability places on our pursuit of them.  
 This constructive discussion of the “dynamics” of Scanlonian reasonable rejection helps 
us construe the practical instantiation of Scanlon’s moral deliberation as a search for moral 
learning among participants. I say that this is “constructive” because Scanlon does not devote 
much space to the practical development of moral commitments on the basis of reasoning. But he 
clearly recognizes its importance: 
[T]he ‘shaping role of the aim of justifiability to others is a dynamic one. There is no fixed list 
of ‘morally relevant considerations’ or of reasons that are ‘morally excluded.’ The aim of 
justifiability to others moves us to work out a system of justification that meets its demands, and 
this leads to a continuing process of revising and refining our conception of the reasons that are 
relevant and those that are morally excluded in certain contexts…[It] is a continuing process, 
not a fixed list of results (1998, pp. 157-58). 
 
Thus Scanlon’s contractualist situation constitutes a promising framework for how morally 
motivated actors can expose one another’s moral mistakes and learn from one another in actual 
political life.  
It may seem strange to spend so much energy in an essay on democracy in interpreting 
the work of T. M. Scanlon, whose work is not addressed to democratic theorists. But aside from 
the distinctive value of Scanlon’s work, Estlund has made this focus necessary. Estlund has, in 
many eyes, hammered a nail in the coffin of the democracy/contractualism analogy. But this is 
mistaken: the nail did not reach its target, and the contents of the coffin remain alive. Debunking 
Estlund’s flawed rejection of the DCA is the key to resuscitating it as a serious contender in the 
ring of candidates for why democracy might have epistemic value.  
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§4. Securing Justice through Democratic Citizenship 
The basis of an analogy between the contractualist situation—in which idealised moral reasoners 
address the primary question—and actual democratic politics—in which we address the primary 
question, endeavoring to emulate the open-mindedness and thoughtfulness of ideal participants 
in so doing—should by now be considerably clearer. The insight I have sought to establish is that 
practices of ongoing discussion, moral learning, and thoughtful reflection have epistemic value. 
How do they have epistemic value? When citizens apply intelligence to their task of finding 
mutually justifiable principles, constantly interrogating their assumptions and learning from 
others, they are more likely to succeed in identifying mutually justifiable principles. Therefore, 
the entrenchment of these practices of conscientious citizenship can better ensure mutually 
justifiable policy outcomes. And given that the best political decision-making process in a liberal 
society is one that produces mutually justifiable outcomes, these practices of citizenship should 
be at the heart of society’s decision-making process. This is the democracy/contractualism 
analogy: a plausible candidate for deliberative democracy’s epistemic value. 
 But what makes it democratic? It should be clear what makes it deliberative. But where 
does democracy—conceived, as I have said, as collective authorisation of the laws by those 
subject to them in the form of voting—fit into this story? Estlund’s discussion presented me with 
an opportunity to entertain the possibility that in a certain kind of society—one in which citizens 
are conscientiously committed to the achievement of liberal justice—there might be a tendency, 
owing to the practices of those citizens, for citizens to develop normatively reasonable political 
convictions, such that they would not seek to impose their comprehensive doctrines on one 
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another. And if there could be a tendency for citizens to be reasonable in this way, such a 
tendency could ground the presumption that having those very citizens make decisions would 
result in reasonable outcomes. If we take this presumption and conjoin it with the idea that some 
decision is needed in the face of disagreement, then democracy—conceived as the collective 
authorization of laws through voting by those subject to those laws—becomes a plausible 
candidate for how decisions should be made in a liberal society, a society in which citizens share 
the aspiration to treat one another as free and equal through the enactment of mutually justifiable 
laws.  
 Two closing clarifications are important. Firstly, I have attempted to resuscitate one 
argument for why deliberative democracy has instrumental value. But this is fully compatible 
with the claim that democracy enjoys other sorts of value, such as its intrinsic value in publicly 
honouring citizens’ status as equals (Thomas Christiano 2008), or the distinct noninstrumental 
value it secures by placing citizens in valuable relationships with one another (Eric Beerbohm 
2012). All I have done here is endorse Estlund’s proposition that part of democracy’s 
justification must be epistemic, and defend (pace Estlund) one way of understanding that 
epistemic value. What serves as a sufficient justification for democratic procedures remains 
unanswered. Secondly, my argument is not that the majority will necessarily have come to the 
most reasonable solution on every issue; the burdens of judgement guarantee contestation on that 
very point. While I have only roughly sketched the normative case for a 
democracy/contractualism analogy in this essay, it is plausible that a fuller exposition would rest 
more explicitly on the claim that the entrenchment of the practices of liberal-democratic 
citizenship – practices of reflection and self-scrutiny – serves not to guarantee that a majority of 
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citizens will converge on the most reasonable conception of justice, once and for all, but rather 
serves to ensure that unreasonable laws and policies are regularly avoided, and that this is 
sufficient for democracy’s justification. This fuller exposition would necessarily be accompanied 
by an investigation of the organisational implications of this argument: how institutions and 
civic practices can be devised intelligently to bring the moral best out of democratic citizens by 
inducing the right forms of deliberative engagement. Even with such an account in place, it is 
important to recognize that we will never be able to say, collectively, that the most reasonable 
solution has been found to every problem we face. The fact that the disagreement about justice is 
reasonable means that we agree on a common criterion—reasonableness—and that a successful 
process of reflection and argument in accordance with that criterion will tend toward better 
conclusions. Of course, we will come to differ during the long course of that process, as the 
burdens of judgement kick in. But it will have pointed us in the right direction: toward justice. 
And in a society in which a preponderance of citizens are engaged in practices that point their 
reasoning in this direction, there is a justified presumption that democratic decision-making will 
tend toward reasonable rather than unreasonable conclusions. 
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